86The issue of implementation is particularly important when the actual mitigation costs are not known at the time of a nation`s participation in the IEA. In the simple model described in Section 6, the agreement is always self-binding, as each participant knows that his departure leads the IEA to reduce emissions by 1 to 0 per member, and the loss of wealth resulting from the overall reduction in reduction costs exceeds the country`s net costs. If costs are uncertain during the participation phase, this type of self-application does not occur. In balance, when? If the expected ex ante costs are reduction, a participant has the total benefit of h (?). If the costs are random, some countries face costs strictly below ?, while others have higher costs. If a country has costs? i > h (?) his ex-post well-being is negative of a member. The country wants to withdraw from the IEA, even though its withdrawal has caused the collapse of the IEA. If costs cannot be verified, it is not possible to verify mitigation targets, with each country being encouraged to exaggerate its own costs. In short, at random costs, the IEA is not self-constrained in the standard model. Therefore, a mechanism must be put in place to encourage countries to comply with their participation decision. Our point here is simply that it is easier to impose the payment of a monetary debt than to impose an environmental result.
International environmental agreements are a category of agreements with political and economic implications that go beyond their environmental impact, but many people do not know their specificities. The search term „What is the Paris Agreement?“ reached its climax the day after the United States announced its withdrawal from the treaty. 39 In short, where investment decisions determine mitigation costs and environmental policy depends on those costs, trade in authorities fundamentally alters the balance of investment. However, in accordance with the previous subsection, there is no presumption that the exchange of authorizations will lead to a higher level of emission reduction than any exchange. Again, the environmental impact of trade in authorizations is ambiguous, given the endogenous mitigation costs. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Privy Council Office, Treasury Secretariat and Foreign Affairs Canada to identify and better understand the key government processes and mechanisms available to ensure accountability for results as soon as the agreements are in place. 1.35 The effects of emissions of ozone-depleting substances are not detrimental to geographic or judicial boundaries. Emissions from abroad affect the ozone layer over Canada in the same way as domestic emissions. Solutions require international cooperation and global action. 1.46 The agreement. In December 2000, Canada signed the protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America amending the air quality agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, which is simply known as the Ozone Annex. The Ozone Annex aims to reduce cross-border air pollution by reducing emissions of ozone precursors in its designated area – in Canada – in central and southern Ontario and southern Quebec.
The long-term goal of the Ozone Schedule for Canada is that ground ozone levels do not exceed Canadian ozone standards.